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Introduction
Humans rapidly learn the social salience of stimuli (Sui et al., 
2013), and the cognitive mechanisms supporting this learning 
are often strongly self-biased (Humphreys and Sui, 2015). 
Furthermore, individuals tend to show a robust preference for 
positive, as opposed to negative, self-information (Sharot, 2011); 
and this self-optimism is thought to be protective for mental 
health (Korn et al., 2012; Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994b). 
Importantly, reduced positive self-bias is implicated in depres-
sion (often referred to as ‘depressive realism’, as in a recent 
review (Moore and Fresco, 2012)) and more recently, in social 
anxiety (Button et al., 2012, 2015).
During a social interaction, individuals use accruing social 
cues to infer what the other person is thinking (e.g. ‘Do they 
like me?’ or ‘Do they agree with what I’ve just said?’). Social 
interactions are therefore dynamic, with social behaviours con-
tingent on evaluative feedback, which is often expressed via 
ambiguous social cues. Thus, reinforcement or instrumental 
learning may be a particularly important mechanism in main-
taining positive self-bias during and after social interaction; 
and disruptions to, or biases in, this mechanism may contribute 
to social anxiety and depression (Button et al., 2012, 2015; 
Korn et al., 2012, 2014). For example, individuals with low 
anxiety make fewer errors learning positive rather than 
negative self-referential evaluation, and, based on the same 
level of objective evidence, rate themselves as being more 
positively evaluated than others ( Button et al., 2012, 2015; De 
Jong, 2002). Selectively disregarding evidence of negative 
self-referential evaluation would presumably increase confi-
dence during social interactions, produce better social out-
comes and reduce the availability of negative information for 
later rumination. This may be one way a positive self-bias pro-
tects mental health.
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Background: Positive self-bias is thought to be protective for mental health. We previously found that the degree of positive bias when learning 
self-referential social evaluation decreases with increasing social anxiety. It is unclear whether this reduction is driven by differences in state or trait 
anxiety, as both are elevated in social anxiety; therefore, we examined the effects on the state of anxiety induced by the 7.5% carbon dioxide (CO2) 
inhalation model of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) on social evaluation learning.
Methods: For our study, 48 (24 of female gender) healthy volunteers took two inhalations (medical air and 7.5% CO2, counterbalanced) whilst learning 
social rules (self-like, self-dislike, other-like and other-dislike) in an instrumental social evaluation learning task. We analysed the outcomes (number 
of positive responses and errors to criterion) using the random effects Poisson regression.
Results: Participants made fewer and more positive responses when breathing 7.5% CO2 in the other-like and other-dislike rules, respectively (gas × 
condition × rule interaction p = 0.03). Individuals made fewer errors learning self-like than self-dislike, and this positive self-bias was unaffected by 
CO2. Breathing 7.5% CO2 increased errors, but only in the other-referential rules (gas × condition × rule interaction p = 0.003).
Conclusions: Positive self-bias (i.e. fewer errors learning self-like than self-dislike) seemed robust to changes in state anxiety. In contrast, learning 
other-referential evaluation was impaired as state anxiety increased. This suggested that the previously observed variations in self-bias arise due to 
trait, rather than state, characteristics.
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Social anxiety is characterised by trait fears of being nega-
tively evaluated by others (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, version 5 (DSM-5)). Cognitive models of 
social anxiety emphasise the role of negative self-schema, sets of 
deeply held beliefs about the self (e.g. ‘I am unlikable’), the 
world (e.g. ‘Social interactions are threatening as others are 
highly critical’) and the future (e.g. ‘It will always be this bad’), 
in maintaining these disorders (Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and 
Heimberg, 1997). Once activated, these schema are thought to 
bias processing of stimuli in a negative way, giving rise to nega-
tive interpretations of social experiences, which in turn lead to 
rumination and social avoidance (Abbott and Rapee, 2004).
Dual process models functionally distinguish between the 
automatic processes occurring during a social interaction and the 
more reflective processing involved in anticipation and post-
event rumination, which might occur before or afterwards (Strack 
and Deutsch, 2004). In support of cognitive models (Clark and 
Wells, 1995), there is good evidence of negative biases in reflec-
tive processes in social anxiety. For example, socially anxious 
individuals are more inclined to negative interpretations of 
ambiguous social vignettes (Amin et al., 1998; Hirsch and 
Mathews, 1997). however, evidence from paradigms tapping 
more automatic processes, such as associative or instrumental 
learning, suggests that rather than being negatively biased, 
socially anxious individuals show a reduction in positive self-
bias relative to controls (Button et al., 2012, 2015; De Jong et al., 
2009; Garner et al., 2006; Hirsh and Mathews, 2000).
To examine the role of self-biased social-evaluative learning 
in social anxiety, and how this relates to post-event reflective pro-
cessing, we developed an instrumental learning task (Button 
et al., 2015). This task required participants to learn social-evalu-
ative rules (‘I am liked’, ‘I am disliked’, ‘Other is liked’ or ‘Other 
is disliked’), by selecting words in a series of positive or negative 
word pairs that fitted most with what a computer persona thought 
about themself or a fictional third person, George (the ‘other’).
The persona provided feedback (i.e. correct or incorrect); and 
the participants used trial and error over a series of trials, to infer 
how they or George were evaluated. At the end each rule, the 
participants were asked to provide a global rating. Therefore, the 
task assessed both learning rates and global interpretations for 
each rule (Button et al., 2015).
The least anxious showed a strong bias for positive words. 
We found evidence of a reduction in this positive bias in social 
anxiety, that was:
1. Specific to cues relating to the self and not others (evi-
dence for reduced positive self-bias);
2. Strongest for negative self-evaluation (consistent with 
core fears of negative evaluation in social anxiety); and
3. Predicted negatively-biased global interpretations.
The latter may reconcile the seeming discrepancy between the 
findings from studies focusing on automatic and reflective cogni-
tive processes, suggesting that absence of positive self-bias when 
learning social evaluation leads to overly negative post-event 
interpretations (Button et al., 2015).
While these findings were consistent with cognitive models 
of social anxiety, the socially anxious individuals in our sample 
also had higher levels of state anxiety. Therefore, we could not 
exclude the possibility that the social anxiety ‘phenotype’ resulted 
from differences in state anxiety, rather than arising from differ-
ences in the trait-like fears and beliefs characterising social anxi-
ety. Disentangling the influence of state and trait anxiety on 
social evaluative inference may have important clinical implica-
tions informing whether the patient’s treatment should target 
fluctuations in their state anxiety or target social anxiety beliefs.
Inhaling 7.5% carbon dioxide (CO2) is shown to robustly 
induce a high state of anxiety (Attwood et al., 2014; Garner et al., 
2011, 2012), and is often used as a model of Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD) (Bailey et al., 2005b, 2007). Breathing 7.5% 
CO2 increases heart rate and blood pressure, as well as subjective 
reports of anxiety, nervousness, worry, apprehension and fear 
(Bailey et al., 2005a, 2007). In humans, the 7.5% CO2 model 
increases sensitivity to threatening stimuli (Garner et al., 2011, 
2012) and increases negative interpretations of ambiguous social 
information presented via real-world close circuit television 
recordings (Cooper et al., 2013). Work in mice suggests a role for 
the amygdala, as inhaled CO2 reduces brain pH and evokes fear 
responses, and these effects seem dependent on acid-sensing ion 
channels in their amygdala (Ziemann et al., 2009). However, indi-
viduals with bilateral amygdala lesions can still show a strong 
response to 35% CO2 (Feinstein et al., 2013), and rather than 
potentiating defensive eye-blink startle responses (which are fear 
responses under the control of the amygdala), a 7.5% CO2 chal-
lenge reduces their speed and magnitude (Pappens et al., 2012; 
Pinkney et al., 2014). This latter finding seems at odds with the 
threat sensitivity and anxiety-inducing effects of CO2 inhalation; 
however, while disorders characterized by focal fear (e.g. specific 
phobia) show robust fear potentiation, disorders of long-enduring, 
pervasive apprehension and avoidance, such as depression and 
GAD (and thus, arguably, social anxiety) show diminished startle 
responses (McTeague and Lang, 2012). Furthermore, the startle 
response potentiation during an interoceptive threat, such as 
mechanically-resisted breathing, seems dependent on attentional 
direction (Pappens et al., 2011), implicating a modulatory role of 
cognitive load (Pinkney et al., 2014). Consistent with this, CO2-
induced state anxiety is associated with increased errors in identi-
fying faces (Attwood et al., 2013) and may impair speech 
perception, potentially via distraction (Mattys et al., 2013).
Turning to other models for increasing state anxiety, it was 
found that the social stress challenge facilitates processing of 
negative, but not positive, emotional information and it consist-
ently impairs working memory (Luethi et al., 2008; Schoofs 
et al., 2008). To our knowledge, no previous studies have inves-
tigated the effects of inducing anxiety, via 7.5% CO2 inhalation, 
on learning social evaluation.
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of state anxi-
ety on social evaluation learning by using the 7.5% CO2 inhala-
tion method to experimentally induce state anxiety in conjunction 
with the social evaluation learning task (Button et al., 2015), in a 
sample of healthy volunteers. The task is a probabilistic learning 
task that assesses the ability to learn four social evaluation rules: 
self-like, self-dislike, other-like and other-dislike. In line with 
previous research (Button et al., 2015), we expected to find a 
strong preference for learning the positive, relative to negative, 
evaluation and that this positive bias would be strongest for the 
self (i.e. positive self-bias).
We hypothesised that increasing state anxiety would increase 
sensitivity to social-threat, manifested as decreasing the study 
subject’s positive (and increasing the negative) responses across 
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all rules in the social evaluation learning task. If supported, this 
would indicate that simply increasing state anxiety via the 7.5% 
CO2 model would not be sufficient to account for the effects of 
social anxiety on evaluative learning; however, we thought that 
increasing state anxiety in those with social anxiety traits might 
exacerbate the effects of social anxiety, as the threat attributed to 
self-negative evaluation would increase. Thus, a second hypoth-
esis was that increasing state anxiety would exaggerate any 
association between social anxiety and self-referential learning; 
however, as the study sample was unselected for trait anxiety, 
we were likely to be underpowered to test trait effects. To reduce 
model complexity and in an aim to boost power, we therefore 
restricted this analysis to a single rule a priori, self-dislike, 
where the association with social anxiety was previously found 
to be the strongest (Button et al., 2015).
Methods
The full methods used in this study are provided in the protocol 
registered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
yig9n/).
Participants
Healthy volunteers were recruited via email from an existing 
mailing list of individuals who have consented to be contacted 
about research studies, by word of mouth, at the university job 
shop or by advertisement on and around the university pre-
cinct. Potential participants completed an online screening 
questionnaire that assessed them for study inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria. Inclusion criteria comprised being between 18 
and 50 years of age, with English as a first language or an 
equivalent level of fluency.
Exclusion criteria comprised:
•	 Alcohol consumption < 36 hours prior to the study;
•	 Not currently being registered with a general practitioner;
•	 Current use of illicit drugs;
•	 Systolic or diastolic blood pressure > 140/90 mmHg;
•	 Heart rate at < 50 or > 90 beats per minute (bpm);
•	 Female gender subjects who were pregnant or 
breastfeeding;
•	 Those with a body mass index (BMI) < 17 or > 30 kg/m2;
•	 Having a significant current or past medical or psychiat-
ric illness;
•	 A strong personal or family history of a mood disorder, 
including panic disorder;
•	 Having an ongoing physical illness or abnormality (e.g. a 
history of cardiac or respiratory problems, including 
asthma);
•	 Having a personal history of migraine headaches requir-
ing treatment;
•	 Drinking > 35 units/week if of female gender or 50 units/
week if of male gender (where one unit equals one 25-mL 
single measure of a spirit at 40% alcohol by volume, or 
one-third of a pint of beer (5–6% alcohol by volume) or 
one-half a standard (175 mL) glass of red wine (12% 
alcohol by volume);
•	 Being regular (i.e. daily) cigarette smokers;
•	 Drinking more than eight caffeinated drinks per day;
•	 A personal history of alcoholism or drug dependence;
•	 Medication use (except as a local treatment, aspirin or 
paracetamol) within the past 8 weeks;
•	 Having impaired or uncorrected vision;
•	 Having hearing problems and/or hearing aids.
This study was approved by the Faculty of Science Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol, UK (# 
2905148227). We conducted our study according to the revised 
Declaration of Helsinki (2013) and good clinical practice guide-
lines; participants gave consent to have their anonymised data 
made publically available (DOI: 10.5523/bris.1wc6gtbaujq5p1i
56fz2vqdmq4).
Materials
As described elsewhere (Button et al., 2012, 2015), the chosen 
social evaluation learning task used 64 word pairs comprised of 
positive and negative words, selected from personality trait 
descriptors (Anderson, 1968).
The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) is a 
12-item, self-rated scale that assesses cognitive aspects of 
social anxiety (Leary, 1983). The Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) are companion 
measures of social anxiety (Mattick and Clarke, 1998). We 
assessed trait and state anxiety using the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory State (STAI-S) and Trait (STAI-T) sub-
scales (Spielberger, 1983).
Procedures
Participants completed one session lasting approximately 2.5 
hours. After providing informed consent, participants were 
screened to ensure that no significant change (e.g. diagnosis of 
illness or use of medication) had occurred since the online screen-
ing. Participants also provided a urine screen for drugs of abuse 
(all participants) and pregnancy (female participants), expired 
breath tests for recent alcohol use and smoking, and readings for 
blood pressure and heart rate. Their height and weight were also 
measured, and the participants’ psychiatric health was assessed 
using a neuropsychiatric interview developed from the Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (Sheehan et al., 
1998). The purpose was to determine good psychiatric health, 
and we terminated the study session if there was any indication of 
symptoms that may be indicative of a psychiatric disorder. 
Therefore, we administered a truncated version of the MINI, 
which comprised the primary questions, and which omitted the 
follow-up questions that aimed to diagnose. Study participants 
also provided contact details for their current General Practitioner.
Prior to the first gas inhalation, baseline measures of blood 
pressure (systolic blood pressure/diastolic blood pressure (SBP/
DBP)), heart rate and state anxiety were taken, as well as the trait 
anxiety measures mentioned in the Materials section. Participants 
were then fitted with an oral-nasal face mask; and they were 
reminded that the gas might make them feel anxious and that they 
could stop the inhalation at any time. During each inhalation, par-
ticipants breathed the gas for 2 minutes prior to beginning the 
social evaluation learning task. These inhalations lasted for the 
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duration of the task (approximately 10 minutes). Immediately 
after each inhalation session, we measured the participant’s blood 
pressure (SBP/DBP) and heart rate, and the participants com-
pleted the state anxiety measure. After a 30-minute ‘wash-out’ 
period, the second inhalation followed an identical procedure to 
the first, except for the gas used. The order of the gas given (med-
ical air or 7.5% CO2) was counterbalanced across the partici-
pants. Upon completion of the study, participants were debriefed 
and reimbursed £20.
The social evaluation learning task is based on probabilistic 
stimulus-reward learning tasks (Button et al., 2012; Chamberlain 
et al., 2006), and adapted to incorporate pseudo-social context 
(Button et al., 2015). The task used in this study is adapted from the 
task used in Button et al. (2015). The original task comprised six 
blocks equating to learning six social evaluation rules: self-like, 
self-neutral, self-dislike, other-like, other-neutral and other-dislike.
As the task was repeated in the two gas inhalations, we 
decided to shorten the task to reduce participant testing time, by 
removing the two neutral blocks. Therefore, the task used in this 
experiment had four rule blocks: self-like, self-dislike, other-like 
and other-dislike. Excluding the neutral rules also conferred ana-
lytical advantages, allowing us to examine learning outcomes, 
such as errors to criterion (e.g. eight consecutive rule-contingent 
answers (Button et al, 2012)), which we were unable to investi-
gate in Button et al. (2015), as positive and negative responses 
are equally correct or incorrect during the neutral evaluation 
rules. Each block lasted 32 trials. The order of presentation of 
self/other and, within that, the order of presentation of the like/
dislike rule was randomly determined by the random option in 
e-prime. Before starting, the investigator instructed the partici-
pant that they would be meeting a series of four personas, during 
the four test blocks. Each persona required the participant to 
learn one of two social rules (person is liked by the persona, per-
son is disliked by the persona) while in one of two conditions, 
self-referential or other-referential.
In each block, the participant was presented with 32 posi-
tive/negative word pairs and they were instructed to select the 
word in each pair that corresponded most with what the persona 
thinks about themself, or about the other. In response to feed-
back as to whether their choice was correct, the participants 
were to use trial and error to learn whether the persona liked 
them or the other.
The feedback contingency corresponded to the different rules:
•	 Like (positive word correct 80%, negative word correct 
20% of the time); and
•	 Dislike (negative word correct 80%, positive word cor-
rect 20% of the time).
Each block ended with the participant rating how much they 
thought the persona liked either them (self-referential) or the 
other person (other-referential). Thus, this global rating phase 
required the participants to reflect on their learning during the 
previous 32 trials. The block structure of the social evaluation 
learning task is shown in Figure 1.
Sample size determination
With a sample size of n = 48, we had 80% power at an alpha level 
of 5% to detect a mean difference corresponding to 6.5 (SD 14) 
fewer positive responses under the medical air versus 7.5% CO2. 
Therefore, this study was powered to test for effects between 
7.5% CO2 and air within participants.
Data analysis
We compared the STAI-S, heart rate and blood pressure scores 
taken after 7.5% CO2 inhalation and air, using paired-sample 
t-tests to check that the CO2 manipulation had the expected effect 
of inducing state anxiety.
The a priori study hypothesis that the positive response rate 
would be lower under 7.5% CO2 relative to medical air was 
examined using random effects Poisson regression (using the 
command xtmepoisson) in the statistical software package Stata 
11 (StataCorp, 2009). The primary outcome measure was the 
count of positive responses, and the Poisson regression was 
appropriate for our count data (Vittinghoff, 2005). To give the 
incidence rate ratios (IRRs), we exponentiated the output, as 
these are more intuitive to interpret as a percent change (e.g. an 
IRR of 1.33 corresponds to a 33% increase in positive responses 
and an IRR of 0.98, a 2% decrease). Therefore, the IRR coeffi-
cients indicated the percent change in the positive response rate 
for each unit increase in the explanatory variable (i.e. gas, con-
dition and rule). We modelled outcome (the count of positive 
words) as a function of gas (medical air or 7.5% CO2), condi-
tion (self and other) and rule (like or dislike), to test for the 
hypothesised main effect of gas on the positive response rate. 
We then introduced the gas × condition, gas × rule and gas × 
condition × rule interaction terms into the model, to test for 
interaction effects.
A positive response rate, while a suitable outcome for assess-
ing bias in valence (e.g. a general negativity / positivity bias), is 
arguably a poor proxy for assessing learning. We previously used 
errors to criterion as our learning outcome, calculated as the 
number of errors made before reaching the criterion of eight con-
secutive rule-contingent answers (where the criterion is not met, 
total errors are used), which may be a more sensitive learning 
measure. In line with Button et al (2012), we therefore repeated 
the above analyses using errors to criterion as the outcome 
measure.
We analysed the global ratings using random effects linear 
regression (using the Stata command, xtmixed), as global ratings 
are normally distributed. Therefore, the regression coefficients 
represent the change in rating score for each unit change in the 
explanatory variable. We modelled outcome (rating) as a func-
tion of gas (medical air or 7.5% CO2), condition (self or other) 
and rule (like or dislike), to test for the hypothesised main effect 
of gas on the positive response rate. We then introduced the gas 
× condition, gas × rule and gas × condition × rule interaction 
terms into the model, to test for any interaction effects.
Unlike our previous studies, which selected for extreme BFNE 
scores (Button et al., 2012, 2015), our present sample was unse-
lected; therefore, BFNE scores clusterd tightly around the popula-
tion mean, thus reducing our power to test for trait social anxiety 
effects. Furthermore, tests for interactions are often underpow-
ered, and to test whether the within participant effects of gas differ 
by trait social anxiety levels would require a substantially larger 
sample, not least because this would require testing a 4-way FNE 
× gas × rule × condition interaction. We previously found that 
social anxiety was associated with fewer positive responses 
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particularly in the self-dislike rule (Button et al., 2015). To max-
imise power to test our second a priori hypothesis, we restricted 
our analysis to the self-dislike rule, where the social anxiety 
effects were expected to be greatest. This reduced model com-
plexity; and using random effects Poisson regression, we mod-
elled the positive responses in the self-dislike rule as a function of 
gas, FNE, and gas × FNE.
Results
Characteristics of participants
We had 48 participants (female participants n = 24) complete the 
testing, providing data for analysis. Their mean age was 23 years 
old (SD 5; range 18 – 50) and their mean BFNE score was 34.8 
(SD 7.0; range 22 – 51). Participant recruitment is shown in 
Figure 2.
CO2 manipulation check
Relative to air, CO2 inhalation increased the participants’ state 
anxiety (mean difference 20.2; 95% CI 17.4, 29.9; p < 0.001), heart 
rate (mean difference 6.9; 95% CI 4.0, 9.9; p < 0.001), and SBP 
(mean difference 4.0; 95% CI 1.6, 6.5; p < 0.001), and had little 
effect on DBP (mean difference 0.4; 95% CI −1.5, 2.3; p = 0.66).
Descriptive data
Table 1 shows the mean (SD) positive response rates and mean 
errors to criterion for each rule in CO2 and air. Inducing state 
anxiety via CO2 had little effect on self-referential learning, both 
in terms of positive response rate and errors to criterion (Table 1). 
By contrast, CO2 led to a substantial increase in errors to crite-
rion in the other-referential condition; and thus, fewer positive 
responses for other-like and more positive responses for other-
dislike (Table 1).
Figure 3 shows the cumulative mean accuracy for the 32 
trials for each rule and condition by CO2 and air. On average, 
individuals showed a preference for learning like relative to 
dislike, which was strongest in the self-referential condition. 
With regards to gas, the self-referential learning curves were 
similar for both air and CO2. By contrast, other-referential 
learning seemed more affected by CO2-induced state anxiety, 
with accuracy lower for both like and dislike rules.
Regression model
Poisson regression modelling the main effects of gas, rule and 
condition, provided little support for our hypothesis that the 
positive response rate would be lower under CO2, relative to 
air (IRR 0.99; 95% CI 0.95, 1.04; p = 0.8). There was a strong 
main effect of rule, as expected, with 73% fewer positive 
responses when learning dislike, relative to like (IRR 0.27; 
95% CI 0.26, 0.29; p < 0.001), and although individuals on 
average made 4% fewer positive responses in the self-referen-
tial condition relative to the other-referential condition, the CIs 
included the null (IRR 0.96; 95% CI 0.92, 1.01; p = 0.105). 
Adding the interaction terms into the model found evidence for 
a gas × rule, and gas × condition × rule interaction (Table 3), 
which is explained by the decreased and increased positive 
Figure 1. Social evaluation learning task.
Block structure repeated four times. For the two self-referential blocks (self-like and self-dislike) ‘you’ is included and ‘George’ omitted from the slides, and vice versa for 
the two other-referential blocks (other-liked and other-disliked).
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Table 1. Mean (SD) for the positive response rate (number of positive responses in 32 trials) and errors to criterion by condition-rule and gas.
Condition-rule Air (n = 48) CO2 (n = 48) Difference
  M SD M SD  
Positive response 
rate
self-like 0.87 0.34 0.84 0.37 0.03
self-dislike 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.00
difference 0.64  0.60   
other-like 0.86 0.35 0.78 0.41 0.07
other-dislike 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.44 – 0.08
Difference 0.68  0.52   
Errors to criterion self-like 3.04 3.97 3.13 4.95 – 0.08
self-dislike 5.38 4.43 5.63 5.91 – 0.25
difference 2.33  –1.83   
other-like 3.06 3.82 5.40 6.03 – 2.33
other-dislike 4.08 4.79 6.56 6.22 – 2.48
difference 1.02  –1.17   
M: mean.
Figure 2. Flow chart of participants through the study.
BMI: Body mass index; GP: general practitioner.
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response rate in the like and dislike rules, respectively, particu-
larly in the other-referential condition (Table 1 shows mean 
differences). In sensitivity analyses, there was no evidence that 
the gas order was associated with positive responses (IRR 
1.03; 95% CI 0.98, 1.08; p = 0.265), and adding gas order into 
the fully saturated interaction model did not alter the results 
substantially.
Examining errors to criterion, we found evidence for the 
main effects of gas, condition and rule (Table 2). Individuals 
made 33% (95% CI 21%, 46%) more errors on average during 
CO2 inhalation relative to air, 11% (95% CI 1%, 22%) more 
errors learning other-referential evaluation relative to self-
referential, and 48% (34%, 63%) more errors learning dislike, 
relative to like. Addition of the interaction terms into the 
model indicated that the main effect of gas were mostly 
explained by interactions with gas × condition, and gas × con-
dition × rule interaction (Table 3), suggesting that the increased 
error rate following CO2 is specific to other-referential pro-
cessing. This is illustrated in Figure 4. In sensitivity analyses, 
inhaling CO2 first was associated with fewer errors than air 
first (IRR 0.66; 95% CI 0.46, 0.95; p = 0.025), but adjusting 
for order did not substantively alter the results either in the 
main effects or the interaction model.
Modulation by trait social anxiety
We found little support for our hypothesis that state anxiety 
would exaggerate the association between FNE and positive 
responses in the self-dislike rule. There was no evidence of a 
main effect of gas (IRR 1.02; 95% CI 0.88, 1.18; p = 0.9), or 
FNE (IRR 1.00; 95% CI 0.98, 1.02; p = 0.99), and no evidence 
of a gas x FNE interaction, (IRR 1.00; 95% CI 0.98, 1.02; 
p = 0.8). With a sample of 48 people with social anxiety scores 
that clustered closely around the population mean, we had 
Figure 3. Learning curves for each rule and gas, by condition. (a) Self-condition and (b) Other-condition.
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insufficient power to test further for modulation effects of 
social anxiety.
Global ratings
There was no evidence of a main effect of gas, or condition, on 
global ratings (coefficient − 0.13; 95% CI − 0.38, 0.13; p = 0.3; 
IRR 0.08; 95% CI − 0.17, 0.34; p = 0.5; respectively). There was 
strong evidence for a main effect of rule (coefficient − 4.61; 95% 
CI − 4.87, – 4.36; p < 0.001), with ratings 4.61 points lower for 
the ‘dislike’ relative to ‘like’ rule, indicating that individuals had 
learned the rules. In contrast to the online learning phase, there 
was little evidence that the effect of gas on ratings differed by 
rule or condition (gas × rule coefficient 0.23; 95% CI − 0.39, 
0.85; p = 0.5; gas × condition coefficient − 0.17; 95% CI − 0.79, 
0.46; p = 0.6; gas × condition × rule coefficient 0.58; 95% CI − 
0.14, 1.30; p = 0.112).
To examine whether responses during the learning phase pre-
dicted the global ratings made afterwards, we added positive 
responses into the main effects model for offline ratings. The 
number of positive responses predicted offline ratings (coeffi-
cient 0.07; 95% CI 0.04, 0.09; p < 0.001) with 10 additional 
Table 2. Incidence rate ratios and 95% CIs from regression models testing for main effects of gas, condition and rule. Air, self and like are the 
reference categories.
Positive responses Errors to criterion
 Coefficient 95% CI p Coefficient 95% CI p
Gas 0.99 0.95 1.04 0.757 1.33 1.21 1.46 < 0.001
Condition 0.96 0.92 1.01 0.105 1.11 1.01 1.22 0.026
Rule 0.27 0.26 0.29 < 0.001 1.48 1.34 1.63 < 0.001
Table 3. Incidence rate ratios and 95% CIs from regression models testing for interactions of gas, condition and rule. Air, self and like are the 
reference categories.
Positive responses Errors to criterion
 Coefficient 95% CI p Coefficient 95% CI p
Gas 0.94 0.88 1.02 0.123 0.95 0.77 1.16 0.604
Condition 0.94 0.88 1.01 0.101 0.85 0.74 0.98 0.026
Rule 0.24 0.22 0.26 < 0.001 1.55 1.34 1.79 < 0.001
Gas × condition 0.99 0.89 1.10 0.895 2.03 1.59 2.60 < 0.001
Gas × rule 1.18 1.02 1.36 0.026 1.16 0.91 1.49 0.236
Gas × condition × rule 1.19 1.01 1.40 0.033 0.68 0.52 0.88 0.003
Figure 4. Bar graphs of mean and 95% CI of the (a) positive response rate (left panel) and (b) errors to criterion (right panel) by condition-rule 
and gas.
Positive response rate is lower to other-like and higher to other-dislike in CO2 relative to air. This manifests as an increased error rate in the other-referential rules in CO2 
relative to air.
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positive responses corresponding to a 0.7 increase in global rat-
ings (rating scale dislike 0 – 10 like).
Discussion
Consistent with the positive self-bias observed in previous 
research (Button et al., 2012, 2015; De Jong, 2002; Korn et al., 
2012), our study participants made more positive responses in the 
self-condition than the other-condition, and made fewer errors 
learning self-like than self-dislike; however, contrary to our pri-
mary hypothesis, we found that increasing state anxiety did not 
induce a uniform decrease in positive responses. Instead, positive 
responses decreased in other-like, increased in other-dislike and 
remained unchanged in both self-referential rules. In terms of 
errors, this manifested as an increase in errors following CO2 
inhalation, in the other-referential rules. Contrary to our second 
hypothesis, CO2 did not influence the association between social 
anxiety and self-referential learning. Indeed, in this unselected 
sample, there was no evidence of an association between trait 
BFNE and positive responses in the self-dislike rule.
Limitations
As the sample was unselected for trait anxiety, we assumed we 
would be underpowered to test trait effects. Therefore, we 
restricted the trait analysis a priori to the self-dislike rule, 
where social anxiety effects were previously found to be the 
strongest (Button et al., 2015); however, the sample that we 
recruited clustered more tightly around the population mean 
BFNE score than expected, thus reducing our power to test for 
trait effects even further. Although our results suggested that 
self-referential processing is robust to fluctuations in state anxi-
ety in a ‘low’ anxious population, we cannot be sure this stabil-
ity in self-referential processing would hold in a highly socially 
anxious group. Further work is required to examine this. 
Furthermore, 7.5% CO2 inhalation models physiological state 
anxiety, enabling us to test the effects of increasing physiologi-
cal arousal and subjective measures of state anxiety on social-
evaluative learning. Further work could investigate whether 
increasing state anxiety via a socially stressful paradigm, such 
as the Tier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) has the 
same effects on social evaluative learning.
Inducing state anxiety is associated with increased threat pro-
cessing (Garner et al., 2011) and increased efficiency in the alert-
ing and orienting attention network function (Garner et al., 2012). 
When inhaling CO2, individuals are more inclined to make a 
threatening interpretation of ambiguous social scenes, when 
viewing close circuit television (Cooper et al., 2013), and to 
show a decreased accuracy in identifying facial expressions 
(Attwood et al., 2013). In light of this, and its use as a model for 
GAD, we hypothesised that increasing state anxiety via 7.5% 
CO2 inhalation would induce a general negativity bias when 
learning social evaluation; individuals would be less inclined to 
choose positive words and more inclined to select negative 
words. However, we found no evidence to support our hypothe-
sis. Instead, we found that increased state anxiety was associated 
with increased errors in learning other-referential evaluation. 
Inducing state anxiety had little influence on self-referential 
processing. These findings are more consistent with state anxiety 
impairing working memory (Luethi et al., 2008; Schoofs et al., 
2008) and thus reducing accuracy, similar to Attwood et al (2013) 
for other-referential learning; however, self-referential process-
ing seems robust to such impairments.
Our results show clear evidence of positive self-bias in this 
healthy and low-anxiety population. Participants made more 
positive word responses in the self-referential compared to the 
other-referential condition, and made fewer errors in learning 
self-like than dislike. These results are consistent with sugges-
tions that positive self-biases are protective for mental health 
(Taylor and Brown, 1988,1994a, 1994b), and are maintained via 
preferentially processing the positive over the negative self-rele-
vant information (Korn et al., 2012).
Our results suggested that self-referential processing is robust 
to changes in state anxiety; inducing state anxiety was not suffi-
cient to induce the loss of positive self-bias associated with social 
anxiety. This is at odds with the effects of CO2 on increasing the 
sensitivity to threat, and threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
closed-circuit television videos (Cooper et al., 2013; Garner 
et al., 2012); however, they are more consistent with findings 
suggesting that 7.5% CO2-induced anxiety interacts with atten-
tional direction and cognitive load (Mattys et al., 2013; Pappens 
et al., 2011). While the current study design cannot directly test 
whether state anxiety modulates social learning in highly socially 
anxious individuals, our results do suggest that previously 
observed variations in self-referential bias arise at least in part 
due to trait, rather than state, social anxiety characteristics. 
Inducing state anxiety is not sufficient to induce the social anxi-
ety phenotype in those without trait social anxiety fears of nega-
tive evaluation. Furthermore, they suggested that the 7.5% CO2 
model of more generalised anxiety may not be useful for model-
ling social anxiety.
In contrast, increased state anxiety was associated with 
increased errors in learning in other-referential evaluation. One 
interpretation of these findings is that self-referential processing 
recruits a strongly ingrained core belief structure (i.e. self-sche-
mata), and is thus less susceptible to changes in state anxiety. 
Self-relevant information is known to receive preferential pro-
cessing (Humphreys and Sui, 2015) and our findings support the 
special nature of self-referential processing. By contrast, other-
referential processing likely recruits less established cognitive 
networks and may thus be more susceptible to the influence of 
state anxiety, potentially via impairing working memory (Luethi 
et al., 2008; Schoofs et al., 2008). This is particularly likely in the 
current paradigm, where the ‘other’ is a fictional character called 
George, of whom participants had little prior knowledge or 
beliefs to base their learning on.
In this study, positive self-referential bias was only evident in 
the online learning phase, and not in the offline learning phase. 
Dual process models functionally distinguish between automatic, 
online processes and the more reflective processes assessed 
offline (Strack and Deutsch, 2004). In support of this, we had pre-
viously found that self-referential offline ratings tend to be more 
negative than the online responses. For example, in extremely 
high socially anxious individuals, an absence of positive self- 
referential bias online (i.e. similar positive response rate for self- 
and other-referential rules, and accurate relative to true rule 
contingency) was associated with a negative bias offline (i.e. rat-
ing themselves less favourably than others, and less favourably 
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than the true rule contingency). Furthermore, individuals in the 
mid-range showed a positive self-referential bias online, but no 
bias offline, as seen in Figure 3 of Button et al. (2015). The results 
from the current study, where the sample clusters tightly around 
the population mean for social anxiety, are consistent with this 
and may reflect the distinct influence of reflective appraisal in line 
with dual-process models (Strack and Deutsch, 2004).
In conclusion, positive self-bias when learning social evalua-
tion seems robust to fluctuations in state anxiety. In contrast, state 
anxiety seems to impair learning of other-referential evaluation. 
This suggested that the previously observed reductions in posi-
tive self-bias in social anxiety were due to social anxiety traits, 
rather than by an increase in state anxiety and arousal.
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